Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting

An International Perspective

Second Edition

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Contents

Preface xix

Part One Introduction 1

1 Introduction and Overview 3
  1.1 What is Venture Capital and Private Equity? 3
  1.2 How Does Venture Capital and Private Equity Differ from Alternative Sources of Capital? 7
  1.3 How Large Is the Market for Venture Capital and Private Equity? 14
  1.4 State of the Venture Capital Market Pre- and Postfinancial Crisis 18
    1.4.1 The Effect of the Crisis on a Venture Capital Industry Already in Distress 25
    1.4.2 Crisis Leading to Opportunities? 26
    1.4.3 Summary 27
  1.5 What Issues Are Relevant to the Study of Venture Capital and Private Equity? 28
    1.5.1 Information Asymmetries and Agency Problems 28
    1.5.2 International Institutional and Legal Context, and Empirical Methods 28
    1.5.3 How to Attract Institutional Investors? 29
    1.5.4 How are Funds Structured? 29
    1.5.5 How Well Are Fund Managers Compensated? 30
    1.5.6 Style Drift 30
    1.5.7 Listed Private Equity 30
    1.5.8 What Role for Government? 31
    1.5.9 Time to Invest: The Process 31
    1.5.10 What Security? 31
    1.5.11 How Do Exit Expectations Influence Financial Contracts? 32
    1.5.12 How Do Legal Conditions Affect Venture Capital Governance? 32
    1.5.13 What Influences Investor Effort? 33
    1.5.14 Do Contracts Ensure Effort? 34
    1.5.15 Where to Invest? 34
1.5.16 How Many Investments? 34
1.5.17 Are There Diseconomies of Scale with Fund Size? 35
1.5.18 Time to Divest: The Process 35
1.5.19 When to Divest? 35
1.5.20 What Exit Vehicle? 36
1.5.21 Valuation and Disclosure 36
Key Terms 36
Discussion Questions 37

2 Overview of Agency Theory, Empirical Methods, and Institutional Contexts 39
2.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 39
2.2 Forms of Finance 40
  2.2.1 Debt 40
  2.2.2 Preferred Equity 41
  2.2.3 Common Equity 42
  2.2.4 Warrants 42
2.3 Agency Problems 44
  2.3.1 Moral Hazard 46
  2.3.2 Bilateral Moral Hazard 47
  2.3.3 Multitask Moral Hazard 47
  2.3.4 Adverse Selection 48
  2.3.5 Free Riding 52
  2.3.6 Hold-Up 52
  2.3.7 Trilateral Bargaining 53
  2.3.8 Window Dressing 53
  2.3.9 Underinvestment 54
  2.3.10 Asset Stripping 55
  2.3.11 Risk Shifting 55
2.4 Does Mitigating Agency Problems Enhance Firm Value? 56
2.5 Summary and Steps Forward in Remaining Chapters 59
Key Terms 59
Discussion Questions 60

3 Overview of Institutional Contexts and Empirical Methods 61
3.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 61
3.2 An Overview of the International Institutional and Legal Context 61
3.3 Statistics and Econometrics Used in This Book 67
  3.3.1 Why Use Statistics and Econometrics and not Case Studies? 67
  3.3.2 What Are the Steps in Analyzing Data? 68
3.4 Summary 75
Key Terms 76
Key Statistical and Econometric Terms 76
Part Two  Fund Structure and Governance  77

4  Fundraising and Regulation  79
  4.1  Introduction and Learning Objectives  79
  4.2  Institutional Investor Objectives from Investment in Private Equity  81
  4.3  Regulation of Institutional Investors and Fund Managers  97
  4.4  Legal and Institutional Details and Testable Hypotheses  99
    4.4.1  Regulatory Harmonization of Institutional Investors  100
    4.4.2  The Dearth of Private Equity Fund Regulation  101
    4.4.3  Why Social Responsible Investments in Private Equity?  103
  4.5  Data  107
    4.5.1  Methods and Survey Instrument  107
    4.5.2  Potential Sample Selection Bias  108
    4.5.3  Summary Statistics  117
    4.5.4  Difference of Means and Medians Tests and Correlation Matrix  120
  4.6  Multivariate Analyses  122
    4.6.1  The Impact of Institutional Investor Regulatory Harmonization on Institutional Investor Allocations to Private Equity  129
    4.6.2  The Impact of a Dearth of Private Equity Fund Regulations on Institutional Investor Allocations to Private Equity  130
    4.6.3  The Impact of Nonregulatory Factors on Institutional Investor Private Equity Allocations  131
    4.6.4  Empirical Evidence on Socially Responsible Institutional Investment  132
  4.7  Extensions and Future Research  138
  4.8  Conclusions  140
  Key Terms  142
  Discussion Questions  142

5  Limited Partnership Agreements  145
  5.1  Introduction and Learning Objectives  145
  5.2  Types of Restrictive Covenants  146
    5.2.1  Category 1: Authority of Fund Manager Regarding Investment Decisions  147
    5.2.2  Category 2: Restrictions on Fund Manager's Investment Powers  148
    5.2.3  Category 3: Covenants Relating to the Types of Investment  148
    5.2.4  Category 4: Fund Operation  149
    5.2.5  Category 5: Limitation of Liability of the Fund Manager  149
  5.3  What Affects the Frequency of Use of Limited Partnership Covenants?  149
    5.3.1  Human Capital Factors Influencing the Use of Fund Covenants  149
5.3.2 Legal and Institutional Factors Influencing the Use of Fund Covenants 150
5.3.3 Fund-Specific Factors Influencing the Use of Fund Covenants 151
5.3.4 Market Conditions and the Use of Fund Covenants 151
5.4 Survey of Private Equity Funds 151
5.4.1 Methods and Survey Instrument 151
5.4.2 Potential Sample Selection Bias 152
5.4.3 Summary Statistics 156
5.4.4 Correlation Matrix 161
5.5 Econometric Tests 163
5.6 Limitations, Alternate Explanations, and Future Research 171
5.7 Conclusion 171
5.8 Key Terms 172
Discussion Questions 173

6 Compensation Contracts 175
6.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 175
6.2 Compensation Contracts in Limited Partnerships 176
6.3 What Affects the Design of Limited Partnership Compensation Contracts? 177
   6.3.1 Human Capital Factors Influencing the Design of Compensation Contracts 177
   6.3.2 Legal and Institutional Factors Influencing the Design of Compensation Contracts 178
   6.3.3 Fund Specific Influencing the Design of Compensation Contracts 179
   6.3.4 Market Factors Influencing the Design of Compensation Contracts 179
6.4 Data 180
   6.4.1 Data 180
   6.4.2 Summary Statistics 183
   6.4.3 Correlation Matrix 187
6.5 Econometric Tests 187
   6.5.1 Econometric Methods 187
   6.5.2 Regression Results 190
6.6 Limitations, Alternate Explanations, and Future Research 201
6.7 Conclusion 203
Key Terms 204
Discussion Questions 204

7 Style Drift 207
7.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 207
7.2 A Theory of Style Drift in Private Equity 209
   7.2.1 Theoretical Model 210
Contents

7.2.2 Outcome Without Signaling ........................................212
7.2.3 Outcome with Signaling Incentives by Skilled Venture
   Capitalists ................................................................213
7.2.4 Alternative Explanations ...........................................214
7.2.5 Empirical Predictions ...............................................215
7.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics .....................................216
   7.3.1 Data Description ..................................................216
   7.3.2 Descriptive Statistics .............................................219
7.4 Regression Analysis .....................................................220
   7.4.1 When Do Private Equity Managers Style Drift? ..........223
   7.4.2 How Does Style Drift Impact Performance? .............226
7.5 Limitations and Future Research ....................................233
7.6 Conclusion ................................................................235
Key Terms ........................................................................235
Discussion Questions .......................................................236
Appendix .........................................................................236

8 Institutional Investment in Listed Private Equity ............239
8.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives .............................239
8.2 Literature and Hypotheses ............................................240
   8.2.1 Search Costs .....................................................240
   8.2.2 Specific Human Capital .......................................242
   8.2.3 Liquidity-Time Preference ...................................243
8.3 Data and Summary Statistics .......................................244
8.4 Multivariate Analyses ..................................................257
   8.4.1 Logit Regressions ...............................................257
   8.4.2 Regression Analyses of Percentage Allocations ........261
8.5 Conclusions ................................................................265
Key Terms ........................................................................265
Discussion Questions .......................................................265

9 The Role of Government and Alternative Policy Options ...267
9.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives .............................267
9.2 Taxation ...................................................................268
9.3 Securities Laws ..........................................................277
9.4 Regulation Pertaining to the Demand for Entrepreneurial
   Capital .....................................................................278
9.5 Regulations Pertaining to the Supply of Entrepreneurial
   Capital ........................................................................279
9.6 Direct Government Investment Programs ........................280
   9.6.1 United States .......................................................281
   9.6.2 Israel ..................................................................282
   9.6.3 Canada ...............................................................282
   9.6.4 United Kingdom ..................................................290
   9.6.5 Australia .............................................................293
   9.6.6 Summary and Other Possible Design Mechanisms for
         Government Venture Capital Funds ..........................300
Part Three  Financial Contracting between Funds and Entrepreneurs  303

10  The Investment Process  305
10.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives  305
10.2 Due Diligence  305
10.3 Stage of Development and Industry  307
10.4 Staging  309
10.5 Fund Flows and Valuations  309
10.6 Syndication  310
10.7 Board Seats  312
10.8 Contract Terms  313
10.9 Summary  316
Key Terms  317
Discussion Questions  317

11  Security Design  319
11.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives  319
11.2 Theory and Hypotheses  323
11.2.1 Agency Costs  323
11.2.2 Taxation  334
11.2.3 Sophistication and Leaning  335
11.2.4 Economic Conditions  335
11.2.5 Summary  335
11.3 Data  336
11.4 Empirical Tests  347
11.4.1 Methodology  347
11.4.2 Empirical Results  353
11.5 Limitations, Alternative Explanations, and Future Research  357
11.5.1 Securities Regulation  357
11.5.2 Other Control Rights  358
11.5.3 Behavioral Finance Factors  358
11.6 Conclusions  358
Appendix  359
Case A: Fixed-Fraction Contract Without Effort-Related Moral Hazard  361
Case B: Fixed-Fraction Contract with Effort-Related Moral Hazard  362
Case C: The Proposed Contractual Arrangement  363
Key Words  367
Discussion Questions  368
12 Preplanned Exits and Contract Design 369
  12.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 369
  12.2 Hypotheses 371
    12.2.1 Preplanned Exits and Venture Capital Contracts. 371
    12.2.2 Law Quality and Bargaining Power in Contract Formation 374
  12.3 Data 374
  12.4 Multivariate Tests 388
    12.4.1 Veto and Control Rights 388
    12.4.2 Security Design 397
  12.5 Limitations and Future Research 400
  12.6 Conclusions 402
  Key Terms 402
  Discussion Questions 403

13 Legal Conditions and Venture Capital Governance 405
  13.1 Introduction 405
  13.2 Legality and Venture Governance 407
    13.2.1 Different Measures of Law Quality 407
    13.2.2 Venture Capital Governance in Relation to Law Quality 409
  13.3 Data and Summary Statistics 413
    13.3.1 Data Description 413
    13.3.2 Summary Statistics 417
  13.4 Regression Analyses 422
    13.4.1 Speed of Deal Origination 422
    13.4.2 Syndication and Coinvestment 428
    13.4.3 Control and Cash Flow Rights 434
  13.5 Limitations and Future Research 439
  13.6 Conclusion 441
  Key Terms 441
  Discussion Questions 442

Part Four Investor Effort 443

14 Investor Value Added 445
  14.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 445
  14.2 Innovation and Efficiency 445
  14.3 Do Contract Terms Facilitate Investor Effort? 447
  14.4 Location 448
  14.5 Portfolio Size and Fund Size 449
  14.6 Investment Duration 449
  14.7 Summary 450
  Key Terms 450
  Discussion Questions 450
15  **Contracts and Effort**  451
   15.1  Introduction and Learning Objectives  451
   15.2  Hypotheses  453
      15.2.1  Allocation of Cash Flow Rights  454
      15.2.2  Allocation of Control Rights  455
      15.2.3  Quality of Legal System  456
   15.3  Methodology  457
      15.3.1  Dependent Variables: Hours per Month, Advice, and Conflict  457
      15.3.2  Explanatory Variables to Test Hypotheses 15.1—15.3  459
      15.3.3  Other Governance Mechanisms, Risk and Controls for Other Factors  462
   15.4  The Dataset  465
      15.4.1  Data Collection  465
      15.4.2  Data Summary  466
   15.5  Econometric Analysis  475
      15.5.1  Hypotheses 15.1—15.3: The Impact of Contracts and Laws on Venture capital fund manager-Entrepreneur Relationships  483
      15.5.2  Other Governance Mechanisms, Risk, and Control Variables  485
   15.6  Limitations, Alternative explanations, and Future Research  488
   15.7  Conclusions  489
   Keywords  490
   Discussion Questions  490

16  **Local Bias**  491
   16.1  Introduction  491
   16.2  Hypotheses  493
   16.3  Data and Summary Statistics  497
   16.4  Testing Local Bias  499
      16.4.1  Geographic Distance Between VCs and New Ventures  499
      16.4.2  Measures of Local Bias  500
   16.5  Factors Contributing to the Local Bias in VC Investments  503
      16.5.1  Summary Statistics of Characteristics of States and VCs  503
      16.5.2  Regression Analysis of Local Bias  506
   16.6  Are Local Ventures More Likely to Be Successful?  514
      16.6.1  The Impact of Distance on the Likelihood of Ultimate Success  514
      16.6.2  Other Robustness Checks  518
   16.7  Conclusions, Implications, and Future Research  518
   Key Terms  519
   Discussion Questions  519
   Appendix  520
### 17 Portfolio Size

- **17.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives** 523
- **17.2 Comparative Statics and Hypotheses** 524
  - 17.2.1 Venture Capital Fund Characteristics 525
  - 17.2.2 Entrepreneurial Firm Characteristics 526
  - 17.2.3 Nature of the Financing Arrangement 527
  - 17.2.4 Market Conditions 528
- **17.3 Data** 529
  - 17.3.1 Description of the Data 529
  - 17.3.2 Comparison Tests and Correlation Matrix 536
- **17.4 Empirical Evidence** 540
  - 17.4.1 Empirical Methods 540
  - 17.4.2 Empirical Results 550
  - 17.4.3 Further Robustness Checks, Limitations, and Alternative Explanations 557
- **17.5 Conclusion** 558

### 18 Fund Size

- **18.1 Introduction** 563
- **18.2 Theoretical Considerations** 566
- **18.3 The Data Set and Summary Statistics** 568
- **18.4 Fund Size, Limited Attention, and Valuation** 571
  - 18.4.1 Measures of Limited Attention 571
  - 18.4.2 OLS Regression Analysis 572
  - 18.4.3 Robustness Checks 575
- **18.5 Fund Size, Limited Attention, and Venture Performance** 581
- **18.6 Conclusion** 585

### Part Five Divestment

- **19 The Divestment Process** 591
  - **19.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives** 591
  - **19.2 The Economics of Initial Public Offerings** 592
    - 19.2.1 Short-Run Performance 593
    - 19.2.2 Long-Run Performance 595
  - **19.3 The Mode of Exit** 596
  - **19.4 International Exit Statistics** 599
  - **19.5 Summary** 600
  
  Key Terms
  Discussion Questions
20 Investment Duration 603
  20.1 Introduction 603
  20.2 Venture Capital Investment Duration 605
  20.3 Institutional Factors Influencing Investment Duration in Canada Versus the United States 608
  20.4 Data and Summary Statistics 613
  20.5 Regression Analyses of Time to Exit 621
  20.6 Discussion and Conclusions 629
Key Terms 631
Discussion Questions 631

21 Contracts and Exits 633
  21.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 633
  21.2 Hypotheses 634
    21.2.1 VC Control Rights 634
    21.2.2 Other Factors Relevant to the Choice Between IPOs Versus Acquisitions 636
  21.3 Variables in the Econometric Specifications 637
  21.4 Data 644
    21.4.1 Sample Description 644
    21.4.2 Summary Statistics 645
  21.5 Multivariate Regressions 659
    21.5.1 Base Regression Models 659
    21.5.2 Endogeneity 662
    21.5.3 Additional Robustness Checks 668
  21.6 Conclusion 674
Key Terms 675
Discussion Questions 675

22 Returns, Valuation, and Disclosure 677
  22.1 Introduction and Learning Objectives 677
  22.2 Reporting Biases with Unrealized Investments: Institutional Background and Hypotheses 679
    22.2.1 Institutional Background 679
    22.2.2 Hypotheses 683
  22.3 Data 686
  22.4 Deriving a Benchmark: The Analysis of Realized Returns 698
    22.4.1 Empirical Methods 698
    22.4.2 Empirical Results 700
  22.5 Analysis of Reporting Biases in Unrealized Investments 705
    22.5.1 Predicted Returns Compared to Reported Returns 705
    22.5.2 Robustness Check: Reported Returns Compared to Subsequently Realized Returns 713
  22.6 Conclusion 716
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Terms</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion Questions</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Venture Capital Valuation Method</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part Six  Conclusion and Appendices</strong></td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23  <strong>Summary and Concluding Remarks</strong></td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>